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ABSTRACT 
DOE has established a number of broad programs aimed at reducing fuel 
consumption. Several programs address the R&D of ground transportation pro-
pulsion alternatives to the conventional spark-ignition engine. NASA Lewis 
is responsible for managing the effort between the Government and industry 
teams involving American and foreign companies. Thus, existing NASA SR&QA 
procedures were modified/adapted to these R&D programs and implemented to 
assure that the test hardware design intent was met, the hardware was not 
hazardous to personnel, it would demonstrate reliable operation, and it would 
help establish the future R&D quality assurance and maintainability require-
ments. This successful low-cost approach might be applicable to other 
similar projects. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Vehicle and Engine Research and 
Development has established a number of broad programs aimed at reducing 
highway fuel consumption. The Heat Engine Highway Vehicle Systems Program 
is one such program. It is directed toward the development of possible 
alternatives to the conventional spark-ignition engine. Implementation of 
the program is through a joint effort between the U.S. Government and U.S. 
and foreign industry in development activities designed to permit the U.S. 
automotive industry the option to enter into preproduction engineering of 
these alternative engine systems. 
Within the broad scope of this technology development program two alter-
natives are being investigated: one is developing the technology for our 
automotive Stirling engine, and the other is developing the technology for 
an automotive gas turbine engine. Each of these involves unique analytical 
as well as technological approaches and associated development needs. Suc-
cess in developing these alternatives depends on finding proper solutions to 
the challenges presented by the selected alternatives. The magnitude of 
these programs, the extensive publicity of their existence, and the objective 
they are to achieve resulted in an unusually high program visibility as well 
as almost an expectation or demand of technological success. 
To meet this challenge and to assure meeting the intent of the corre-
sponding designs, senior management at NASA Lewis issued a directive to 
implement the product quality assurance methodology so successfully imple-
mented in previous programs. These programs, however, dealt with aerospace 
technology. Thus, in meeting the directive, the usual aerospace approach to 
quality assurance was overbearing and had to be modified to be as compatible 
as possible with the quality assurance methodology already in place within 
the U.S. industry being funded to carry out these research and development 
programs. Yet these quality assurance procedures must be compatible with 
the special needs and contraints of the complex nature of the R&D programs. 
The process of evolving and implementing quality assurance procedures in R&D 
programs using Stirling and gas turbine engine development as illustrative 
examples is described herein. Gas turbine engine technology development 
involved efforts by contractor teams - namely, Garett/Ford and Detroit Diesel 
Allison (DDA). The latter is used as an illustrative example of gas turbine 
engine technology development because of the author's familiarity with the 
DDA efforts. 
SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 
In discussing the process of evolving and implementing quality assurance 
in R&D programs it is necessary to describe each alternative system. 
One of the selected alternatives is the development of the automotive 
Stirling engine (ASE) illustrated in figure 1. The most pronounced charac-
teristic of the ASE is its external combustion and closed-loop working gas 
arrangement to convert heat into work energy. The cycle is illustrated in 
figure 2. The expansion and contraction of the working gas, as it moves 
back and forth between the hot and cold spaces within the engine, causes the 
pistons to reciprocate and thus rotate the drive shaft. Although almost any' 
type of gas may be used as a working fluid in the Stirling cycle, gaseous 
hydrogen, because of its heat-transfer characteristics and the resulting 
high power output, has been selected. The combination of high-temperature 
environment present in the combustor with the gaseous hydrogen working fluid 
results in very demanding conditions in which structural materials must sur-
vive. 
The other selected alternative is the automotive gas turbine propulsion 
system. Figure 3 shows a two-shaft regenerative gas turbine engine. It 
operates by continuously combusting a fuel and high-pressure air mixture. 
The resulting hot expanding gases are then directed through the turbines 
where the energy from their high pressure and temperature is converted to 
rotational energy to drive the compressor and provide power to the output 
shaft. 
The gas path facilitating this function is illustrated in figure 4. The 
key to successfully developing this alternative is the introduction of ce-
ramic materials in selected components (fig. 5). These components are 
essential to increasing the turbine operating temperature regime and thus 
the efficiency. Introducing ceramic material components entails extensive 
development of manufacturing processes, material characterization techniques, 
nondestructive evaluation methods capable of consistently detecting lO-~ 
critical size defects, process controls, and numerous other factors. 
PROGRAM MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE 
The Department of Energy (DOE) was designated by Congress (Public Law 
95-238, Heat Engine Bill) as the Government agency responsible for initiating 
programs to develop unique automotive and fuel technology. Under an int~r­
agency agreement with DOE, the National Aeronautics and Space Administra-
tion's Lewis Research Center was given the project management responsibility 
for these alternative automotive propulsion system projects. Within Lewis, 
the Energy Directorate was established to develop, conduct, and direct these 
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projects. The Director of Lewis has instructed the Chief of the Reliability 
and Quality Assurance Office in conjunction with the Director of Energy Pro-
grams to develop and implement reliability, quality assurance, and project 
safety programs within the energy projects commensurate with DOE require-
ments, project objectives, and overall cost effectiveness. The interrela-
tionship among DOE, NASA, and the contractor is illustrated in figure 6. 
During 1978-1979, the U.S. Government negotiated appropriate contracts 
with U.S. industry to carry out the R&D effort. The industry team for the 
ASE program is shown in figure 7. Mechanical Technology Inc. (MTI) of 
Latham, New York, is the prime contractor responsible for coordinating engine 
and component development as well as transferring Stirling cycle engine 
technology to the United States. United Stirling (Sweden) AB and Co. (USAB) 
is the major subcontractor for engine design, development, testing, and 
manufacture. USAB has successfully developed the analytical capability 
characterizing the Stirling cycle and has reduced that capability to practice 
by building a 40-kW test engine. The engine (designated P-40) demonstrated 
that this type of engine could be developed into an automotive power train 
system for passenger vehicles and that it could produce favorable results. 
AM General Corporation of Detroit, Michigan, is the major subcontractor re-
sponsible for engine-vehicle integration. This aspect was successfully 
demonstrated by installing P-40 engines in a 1977 Opel, a 1979 AMC Spirit, 
and a 1980 AMC Concord. As a result of these successful demonstrations, 
this industrial team has now completed the design and manufacture of four 
automotive Stirling engines designated MOD-I (fig. 1). One of the engines 
has been installed in an AMC Lerma passenger vehicle for transient testing. 
The other three are being tested in engine test stands at MTI in Latham, New 
York, and Malmo, Sweden, to obtain performance data, verify design, and 
establish component development technology. 
Figure 8 illustrates the U.S. industry team responsible for developing 
the AGT 100 engine system. Detroit Diesel Allison (DDA), a Division of 
General Motors in Indianapolis, Indiana, is the prime contractor responsible 
for developing the engine power train and accomplishing the overall program. 
Success of this program hinges on the team of major subcontractors respon-
sible for developing the ceramic components: Carborundum, silicon carbide 
components; Corning Glass, aluminum silicate regenerators; GTE, silicon 
nitride rotors. Other divisions of GM form the remainder of the major par-
ticipants responsible for engine-vehicle integration, testing, component 
assemblies, electronic controls, marketing studies, and other functions 
listed in figure 8. 
RELIABILITY AND QUALITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS AND IMPLEMENTATION 
A consistent set of R&QA requirements was established for automotive 
propulsion R&D programs. It requires the contractor to plan, maintain, and 
implement a product assurance program. This also entails system safety and 
reliability functions. The product assurance requirements, however, apply 
to all critical hardware. The critical hardware is identified by the con-
tractor and approved by NASA project management. In using this approach, 
both the contractor and Government project office are spared the excessive 
trivial problem of tracking noncritical hardware and the documentation such 
tracking can entail. The list of critical parts is periodically reviewed 
and adjusted to resolve arising problems. 
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These product assurance requirements are not intended to impose a sep-
arate or unique system on the contractor. The contractor's existing product 
assurance system is considered adequate upon satisfactory demonstration to 
NASA Lewis that it fully meets the product assurance requirements envisioned 
for these programs. Unfortunately, in the case of USAB, these requirements 
did impose a unique system because the company did not have an acceptable 
quality assurance system in place. . 
It is the contractor's responsibility to prepare, implement, and maintain 
a detailed product assurance plan. In this plan the contractor describes 
how compliance with requirements is ensured and identifies an individual as 
a cognizant contact. The plan is submitted to NASA Lewis for review and 
approval 30 days after contract initiation. It is very important to under-
stand that although the R&QA requirements are the same for each contractor 
the method of implementation is adjusted to the individual contractor's sys-
tem; hence, the quality assurance plans are not expected, nor are they re-
quired, to be identical in format or methodology. 
The requirements consist of two basic elements: reliability and quality 
assurance. The reliability element entails design reviews and system s~fety 
analyses. Design reviews require the contractor to establish and conduct a 
program of planned, scheduled, and documented reviews of the system, subsys-
tem, and component level. Participation is required by cognizant personnel 
from design, fabrication, test, reliability, safety, and other appropriate 
elements of the contractor's organization. However, since some of the 
elements just identified may not exist as such at a given contractor's or-
ganization, he identifies his design review process in the quality assurance 
plan. Once the plan is approved by NASA, the contractor must live up to the 
responsibilities and mode of operation he has structured. In connection 
with these reviews, the contractor is required to submit to NASA the fol-
lowing: 
1. Notification is necessary 10 working days before each review of the 
firm date, time, location, and material information to be reviewed. 
2. Design Review Reports are required within 10 days. These reports 
contain the information presented at the review, the actions to be taken, 
the organizational elements or individuals responsible for carrying out the 
action items, and the attendees present at the review. 
A system safety analysis requires the contractor to employ existing 
rigorous analysis techniques to ferret out design weaknesses and determine 
possible modes of failure. The primary objective of these analyses is to 
identify critical failure areas, affect removal of susceptiblity to such 
failures or their effects from the system, and to minimize the risk. The 
system safety analyses are to be a major factor in design and management 
reviews. They are to provide criteria useful for 
1. Determining need for fail-safe design features 
2. Determining need to select more reliable materials, parts, devices, 
or components 
3. Identifying single failure points 
4. Supporting hazard analysis tasks 
5. Assuring that future test planning is responsive to known or suspected 
potential failure modes 
6. Establishing future mandatory quality inspection points 
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The quality assurance element entails maintenance by the contractor of 
an effective and timely quality system to discover and correct at the ear-
liest practical point defects or other unsatisfactory conditions. This is 
intended to determine material and product quality from the time raw mate-
rials are purchased until completion of the article, whether the article is 
to be delivered to the Government or used in the program. The basic objec-
tive is to provide recorded evidence of the extent of meeting the design 
intent. This is accomplished in the form of a series of actions as follows: 
1. Drawing and Change Control - to assure that articles are purchased, 
fabricated, inspected, and tested to the latest applicable drawing or speci-
fication. 
2. Procurement Source Control - exercise effective control over procure-
ment sources to ensure that materials, supplies, components, and services 
meet the quality as well as design requirements. Thus, an effective purchase 
order control and an assurance of conformance with requirements of the pur-
chase order are essential. 
3. Material Identification, Handling, Storage - to control the raw and 
fabricated materials and to determine their conformance to applicable speci-
fications and drawings. In so doing, the contractor separates and prevents 
the use of materials which do not conform to the requirements or are awaiting 
the completion of test results and Material Review Board actions. These 
controls are maintained from the time the material is received until its use 
in the program is completed. 
4. Identification Control Procedure - assignment of appropriate part 
number, change letter, and serial numbering system for all major parts and 
subassemblies. 
5. Inspections, Tests, and Process Controls - inspections and tests of 
critical parts, components, and assemblies to ensure conformance to appli-
cable drawings and specifications. In addition, inspections and controls 
are established over processes to ensure compliance with quality requirements 
which are not readily detectable or measurable by inspection and test of the 
finished article. The contractor is responsible for maintaining a suitable 
inspection of his tools and gages, and for assuring their proper calibration. 
Appropriate inspection status indications are maintained by the contractor. 
6. Nonconforming Articles - identify and separate such articles from 
normal work operations. When the contractor wishes to use a nonconforming 
article in the program operations, he prepares a suitable quality assurance 
report (QAR), an example of which is shown in figure 9. The QAR is submitted 
to the contractor's Material Review Board (MRB) for disposition~ The MRB 
consists of a cognizant engineer and a cognizant quality assurance represen-
tative. Decisions to accept nonconforming articles by the MRB are documented 
using the QAR. It shows the details of nonconformity and the appropriate 
disposition such as repair, use as is, or scrap. Concurrence with the dis-
position actions by the contractor and NASA project managers is required. 
7. Corrective Action - to correct conditions which have resulted or might 
result in substandard or defective materials, parts, components, or services. 
These actions are documented using the QAR or any other suitable means to 
correct existing deficiencies and to minimize their occurrence in the future. 
8. Equipment Log for Engine Systems - to document the continuous history 
of the item. This documentation is maintained throughout the inspection, 
assembly, and test of engine systems. The log is maintained in chronological 
order and accounts for all time periods including idle periods. Log entries 
are self-explanatory and may include the following: date of assembly and 
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disassembly, identity of test or inspection, environmental conditions, 
characteristics being investigated, performance parameter measurements, com-
plete identification of instrumentation, failure observations, applicable 
failure report references, accummulated operating time on critical items, 
configuration identification of critical parts in the system (by serial num-
bers), nonconforming article identification, documentation reference, repair 
and maintenance records, record of pertinent, unusual, rir questionable 
occurrences, and identity of the individual operating the equipment and 
making entries. 
9. Operating Time Records - a consolidated record of operating times for 
each critical engine component used in the test program. The engine compo-
nents are identified by part and serial number. These records are to be 
included in the final test report. 
10. Failure Reporting - functional failure occurring in the test program. 
A failure notice is written immediately when a failure occurs, and this re-
port is sent within 24 hours by the originating function to the NASA project 
manager or his representative. In case of the ASE program, the QAR (fig. 9) 
is used very effectively for this purpose. The failure notice, which is 
filled out as completely as possible at the time of the failure, is written 
in clear, concise language. If appropriate, a followup failure analysis is 
submitted to the NASA project manager or his representative no later than 30' 
days after a failure. Such reports usually contain a complete description 
of the failure, an analysis of the causes, recommendations for corrective 
action, and the corrective actions taken. The NASA prodect manager or his 
representative is required to approve the failure analysis and the corrective 
action taken. 
These general requirements are implemented by the various contractors 
using the quality assurance methodology already in place at their respective 
facilities. By using his own specific quality assurance plan the contractor 
makes a purposeful commitment of the available quality assurance methodology, 
personnel, and resources to attain the intent of the design. This commitment 
results in an active program which also provides thorough documentation of 
various factors affecting hardware quality and compliance to or deviation 
from requirements and their effects on the intent of the design. In R&D 
programs where interactions between unknowns or variables are not easily 
predictable, such documentation provides consistency of information as well 
as a more orderly resolution of problems. For example, in the early stages 
of the ASE program, using QAR's to report failures highlighted a problem 
which was successfully resolved by a minor design change. At the time, the 
problem was being identified as check valve failure. The identification was 
not quite proper, because the check valve failure was actually a failure of 
an O-ring in the check valve assembly. As illustrated in figure 10, check 
valve failures were unacceptably frequent. A design change to more properly 
accommodate the troublesome O-ring arrangement resulted in a favorable out-
come. Although this failure mode still occurs, it is less frequent and more 
easily controlled by procedures. 
Both MTI and DDA successfully implemented the R&QA requirements in their 
R&D programs. Each contractor faced a unique set of problems and had to 
resolve them in his own way. There is no intent to compare one against the 
other or to determine that one approach was better than another. It seems 
appropriate to highlight the unique problems each prime contractor faced. 
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In the case of Automotive Stirling Engine Program, the most difficult 
problem was implementing the quality assurance program at the major subcon-
tractor USAB. USAB was the source of the knowledgetechnology to be trans-
ferred to United States and was responsible for designing and manufacturing 
the engines. The company was basically a research-oriented organization 
with limited personnel resources. Influx of numerous parts, test operations, 
and all other activities associated with the program overwhelmed their capa-
bilities. The quality assurance program was not consistant to the level 
required of the prime contractor. The situation at MTI was not much differ-
ent. There was no choice but to establish a product quality assurance 
program capable of serving the program needs. MTI's program management 
earnestly supported such action with very successful results. One of the 
examples is the use of the QAR system (fig. 11) among the various partici-
pants. The originating participant submits the QAR to MTI who redistributes 
it to all participants. When the issue is resolved, completed QAR's are 
distributed to the participants clearly stating the resolution. This system 
was very useful in exchanging experiences between test operations personnel 
and in finding solutions to nagging detailed problems without tying up the 
designer's time. 
The language, use of standard Swedish tolerance tables, geographic dis- ' 
tances, and time zone differences presented additional complications. These 
complications were not insurmountable, but additional time was required to 
fully implement quality assurance plans. Since all parties involved dili-
gently applied their best judgments, a successful implementation of R&QA 
practices in an R&D program resulted. 
The only shortcoming is that system safety analysis techniques were not 
more extensively employed when evaluating the designs and operations. 
The challenge faced by DDA was due to the extremely fast advancement of 
ceramic technology which appeared to be at hand, but not fully so. The 
designers were faced with material properties information that was not com-
pletely defined. An additional factor was, and still is, the highly pro-
prietary nature of ceramic technology development. DDA has an elaborate and 
very effective quality assurance program in place, but proprietary restric-
tions adhered to by the ceramic parts suppliers precluded effective extension 
of DDA's quality assurance program to the vendors. This resulted in ap-
proaches by DDA to obtain the necessary material properties information. 
Eventually these approaches resulted in the suppliers defining their process 
controls more precisely. In order to better understand behavior of ceramic 
components and assure their acceptability for engine builds, DDA employed 
evaluation rigs and tests in which ceramic parts were exercised in stress 
environments at, or exceeding, the levels expected in engine operation. 
Since a system of codes designating process variants known only to the sup-
plier was devised, the prime contractor can relate rig data with process 
code. Part failures in rig tests are investigated by DDA's materials experts 
and causes are identified. Such data obtained by the prime contractor are 
transmitted readily to the supplier, thus influencing his process control. 
In turn, the supplier is obligated to keep the prime contractor informed of 
process changes by adjusting the code. 
Use of evaluation rigs also circumvents, albeit temporarily, the imme-
diate need of extremely powerful nondestructive test methodology to detect 
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the aforementioned 10-~ critical size defect. Indications are that more 
effective and extensive manufacturing process controls may partially alle-
viate this problem, but much work remains to be done. 
This program employs a delegation of quality assurance activities from 
NASA Lewis to Defense Contract Administration Services (DCASPRO). The use 
of these services is unusual in an R&D program, and it may be the first time 
it has been done. The delegation allows NASA to have an inspector at all 
the critical activities of this program. The inspector is to observe, re-
port, and ensure that corrective action as concurred by NASA is carried out. 
The definition of delegation and personnel assigned to carry out the task 
resulted in a most rewarding experience. The inspector is very effective, 
and he has established a very respectable rapport with his counterparts at 
DDA. As a result, he is aware of all the major and most of the minor prob-
lems of this program, and his advise is readily sought and, if applicable, 
heeded. NASA Lewis has retained the full authority under the delegation. 
To facilitate the assembly of the AGT 100 engine, DDA's management im-
posed on itself an accelerated build program. The objective of the program 
was to have all 392 parts in finished stores before assembling the initial 
engine. That meant that all the standard inspection and quality assurance 
activities normally carried out by DDA also had to be accomplished for the 
392 parts. To achieve this and provide proper priority for all the necessary 
activities, DDA established a task force in which engineering, design, manu-
facturing, and quality assurance functions were represented. Qualityassur-
ance functions were represented by a senior quality assurance engineer from 
experimental inspection. Our inspector was invited to attend DDA's executive 
reviews as well as task force meetings. This cooperative effort with DDA's 
senior quality assurance engineer provided rapid and, from a quality assur-
ance point of view, orderly and proper progression of the program. For the 
first build, all parts were inspected completely (100 percent) if their 
quality, materials compatibility, and compliance with the drawing require-
ments could not be properly verified by previous inspection records, certi-
fications, etc. The system is a very orderly, common sense one which is 
flexible to suit the needs of the program without compromising quality. 
This approach with DDA management's unequivocal backing resulted in com-
pleting a difficult job in a rapid, thorough, and examplary manner. DDA's 
management recognized the contribution these team members have made to the 
program's success by accomplishing the assigned task with skill and with 
interest in meeting cost targets while obtaining quality parts. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Management's commitment to implementing quality assurance in R&D programs 
provided the needed visibility to quality assurance activities. It also 
facilitated effective use of failure reporting as a way of highlighting re-
ocurring problems. Management's actions on the recommendations for correc-
tive actions provided stronger impetus in affecting these corrective actions. 
The overall product quality assurance program has been successfully 
implemented in R&D projects and has contributed to their successful progress. 
However, some facets of the product quality assurance program have been par-
tially implemented. One of these is a more effective use of system safety 
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analysis techniques such as fault tree analysis (FTA), failure modes and 
effects analysis (FMEA), and other available techniques in the design phase 
of the efforts. There also seems to be a tendency not to include quality 
assurance functions in the design phase of the effort until final design 
approval has been obtained. It is recognized that there is a broad spectrum 
of these activities required, ranging from very minimal in a basic research 
program to very substantial in the manufacture of a piece of hardware to do 
a specific job. In these situations it becomes a matter of judgment in de-
termining the pertience and proper degree of implementation of the quality 
assurance techniques. 
It is recommended that management not view product quality assurance as 
a quality control only. Early involvement of the quality assurance engin-
eering function in conceptual or preliminary design phases results in a 
better design, more properly inspectable hardware, more reasonable require-
ments, more proper use of resources, less cost, etc. A more intensive and 
timely use of system safety analysis techniques as a design evaluation tool 
or method is most strongly recommended. These techniques if properly exer-
cised can uncover undesirable weaknesses in the design before building the 
hardware, provide tradeoff studies leading to the most suitable appr.oach, 
and help find a better approach to quality assurance planning, critical in- ' 
spection points, process control requirements, etc. 
These are the early, if not the first, steps in extending quality assur-
ance functions to the origins of R&D undertakings. Adjustments of the 
available methodology will have to be made to comply with the unique needs 
of individual programs. A strong commitment by management, combined with 
prudent tailoring of quality assurance methods to the program needs, cannot 
be anything else but cost effective and successful. 
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